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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, international organizations have come to play a major role in
international and national affairs. All states (apart from the Vatican City) are
members of the United Nations and subject to the binding resolutions of the
Security Council, such as the series of resolutions imposing a broad range of
obligations relating to activities prescribed as 'terrorist';' many states are
subject to the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, from the WTO
dispute settlement process to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.2
Since 1945 international organizations have often been involved in the arena of
military action, whether in providing legal authority, such as the Iraq war in
199 1, or conducting operations on the ground, from all-out military campaigns

such as the NATO bombing of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
in 1999, 4 to peace operations such as the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia
and Eritrea (UNMEE) stationed at the Ethiopia-Eritrea border.5

For those states that become the target for concerted international intervention, the power wielded by international organizations can be acute,
especially in circumstances where international organizations assert administrative prerogatives over territory.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, has

been subject to a UN-authorized regime of military occupation by NATO (from
1995 to 2004 through SFOR, formerly IFOR)7 and then the European Union
(through the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), since December

1.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,2000); S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1390 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).
2.

See generally PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

3.

S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).

(1999).
4.
See the information contained in the Legality of Use of Forcecases before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), availableat http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2006).
5.
On the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and
http://www.un.orglDeptsldpko/missions/unmee (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).

Eritrea

(UNMEE),

see

6.
On the range ofprojects involving the administration of territory by international organizations
since the beginning of the League of Nations, see e.g., R. Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond:
the Role ofInternationalTerritorialAdministration, 95 Am. J. INT'LL. 583 (2001) [hereinafter Wilde 2001 ].
7.
See S.C. Res. 1031 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995) (discussing the establishment of
a multinational implementation force (IFOR)); S.C. Res. 1088 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996)
(discussing authorization of the establishment of a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as legal successor
to IFOR); see also the NATO IFOR and SFOR websites: http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2005) and http://www.nato.int/sfor (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
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2, 2004)' and partial administration by a range of different international
structures, from the sui generis international organization called the Office of
the High Representative, which asserts the power to dismiss elected officials
and impose laws,9 to foreign nationals appointed by international organizations
sitting as members public bodies, such as the three members of the
Constitutional Court appointed by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights,'° and an OSCE-run electoral system, which operated from 1996
to 2004.11
More recently, international organizations in general, and the United
Nations in particular, have been placed under greater critical scrutiny, as
reflected in the UN reports on the failure to prevent the 1993 genocide in
Rwanda 2 and the July 1995 genocide in Srebrenica,"3 the outcry that followed
evidence of involvement of UN peacekeepers in trafficking and forced
prostitution 14 and the misuse of funds and corruption relating to the Oil for

8.
See S.C. Res. 1575, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1575 (Nov. 22, 2004). See also the EUFOR website,
http://www.euforbih.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
9.
On OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g., Wilde, supra note 6, at 584 n.4 & 8,585 n.10,
594-96, 599-601, sources cited therein and accompanying text
10.
On the international appointments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g., Wilde, supra note 6,
at 584 n.9 sources cited therein and accompanying text, 597, 599.
11.
On the OSCE's role in operating the electoral system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g.,
Wilde, supra note 6, text accompanying note 91 and sources cited therein. On the first entirely locally-rn
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina since Dayton, see, e.g., Bosnia's Nationalists Lead Poll, BRITISH
BROADCASTING CORPORATION (BBC), Oct. 3, 2004, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
3709340.stm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
See Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994
12.
genocide in Rwanda, contained in the Letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the United Nations Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999).
See United Nations Secretary-General, Reportpursuantto GeneralAssemblyResolution 53/35,
13.
The fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,2006). In its 2004 judgment, the Trial Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia convicted Radislav Krstic, at the time of
the massacre the Chief of Staff and, subsequently, the Commander of the Drina Corps, a formation of the
Bosnian Serb Army whose zone of responsibility covered the Srebrenica area, of genocide, thereby providing
the first judicial determination that the Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide. See Prosecutor v. Krstic,
353, 688 (Aug. 2, 2004), available at
Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment,
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialCl/judgement/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
14.
See, e.g., United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Report of the Office of Internal
Oversight Services on the investigationinto sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa,
U.N. Doc. A/57/465 (Oct. 11, 2002); United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, Investigationby
the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the United
Nations OrganizationMission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/59/661 (Jan. 5,2005);
Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General, A
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Food Programme in Iraq which ran from 1996 to 2003." This more critical
climate has extended to the ever-expanding activities of the Security Council;
for example, in its report of 2004, the expert UN High-level Panel raised
concerns with the "terrorist list" which is used by the Council's so-called 1267
Committee to denominate the individuals and organizations in relation to whom
member states are obliged to take certain actions (e.g. freezing assets) under
some of the aforementioned terrorism resolutions.16 According to the High-level
Panel:
The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list
maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for
those listed raises serious accountability issues and possibly violate
fundamental human rights norms and conventions.17

comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, U.N. Doc. A1591710 (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the S-G's Special Advisor]; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, HOPES BETRAYED: TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS TO POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

FOR

FORCED

PROSTITUTION

(Nov.

9,

2002),

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/Bosnia1l02.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
15.
The Oil-for-Food Programme was established by S.C. Res. 986 (1995), UN Doc. S/RES/986
(Apr. 14, 1995); the implementation of the programme started in December 1996, after the signing of the
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on 20 May 1996
(U.N. Doc. S11996/356 (May 20, 1996)). On the phasing down and termination of the Programme, see S.C.
Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,2003). See also U.N. OFFICEOFTHE IRAQ PROGRAM-OIL-FORFOOD, http://www.un.orgIDeptsloip/index.html (last visited Nov, 5,2005). The allegations of mismanagement
and corruption in the context of the Oil-for-Food Programme have been recently confirmed by the
Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, Report on the
Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://www.iicoffp.org/MgmtReport.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). See also Press Release, Secretary-General's
statement to the Security Council on receipt of the Independent Inquiry Committee (UC) report on Oil-forFood, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1657 (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
16.
The obligations so imposed on Member states include freezing the assets of listed individuals
or groups, preventing the entry into or the transit through their territories of listed individuals, and preventing
the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment to the individuals or groups
included on the list. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1390 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16,2002); S.C. Res. 1455 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1617
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). The implementation of these obligations is supervised by the socalled '1267 Committee'. On the Committee, see UNrrED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE
ESTABLISHED PURSUANTTO RESOLUTION 1267, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267Template.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
17.
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, 152, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
See also Case T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission, European Court of First Instance, Sept. 21, 2005.
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In the academy, this shift towards a more critical approach is reflected the
decision of the International Law Association (ILA) to create an international
research Committee on the "Accountability of International Organizations,"
which completed its work in 2004.18
UN reform measures and proposals relating to accountability, including
those agreed at the Summit of the General Assembly in 2005, essentially
concern internal administrative measures, for example strengthening internal
oversight mechanisms including the Office of Internal Oversight Services
(OIOS), 19 creating a new Oversight Committee to co-ordinate internal
accountability mechanisms,2" introducing a new internal Office of Ethics, 2! and
strengthening staff codes of conduct and disciplinary measures.22 This internal,
administrative approach is reflected in the High-level Panel's prescription for
to
addressing the aforementioned accountability concerns it raised in relation
23
Committee:
1267
Council's
Security
the
by
maintained
list
the terrorist
The A1-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a
process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions
claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists.24

18.
See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON THE
AccOuNTABumrY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2004) [hereinafter ILA 10 Accountability Report]
and Resolution No. 1/2004, both availableat http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layoutcommittee.htm (last visited
Mar. 22,2006) (follow the 'Accountability of International Organizations' link). For further academic debate
on the accountability of international organizations, see the academic sources cited infra in notes 26 and 59.
On mandate, composition and functioning see United Nations Office of Internal Oversight
19.
Services (OIOS) website, http://www.un.org/depts/oios (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); see also G.A. Res.
48/218B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218B (July 29, 1994); G.A. Res. 54/244, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/244 (Dec. 23,
1999); G.A. Res. 59/272, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/272 (Dec. 23, 2004). The 2005 World Summit Outcome
(recommended, interalia, that "[tihe expertise, capacity and resources of the Office of Internal Oversight
Services in respect of audit and investigations... be significantly strengthened as a matter of urgency.") See
G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 164(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit
Outcome].
20.

See generally the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Measures to strengthen

accountabilityat the UnitedNations,U.N. Doc. A/60/312, i 24-28 (Aug. 30,2005) [hereinafter S-G Report
on accountability]; 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 19, 164 (c).
21.

See generally S-G Report on accountability, supranote 20, 140; see also 2005 World Summit

Outcome, supra note 19, 1 161 (d).
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/287,1 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/287 (Apr. 13,2005); UNITED NATIONS,
22.
DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
IN 20-23 (2004); Report of the S-G's Special Advisor, supra note 14, [ 68-71.
23.

On the Committee, see supra note 16.

24.

High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17,
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The only external, judicial measure being contemplated relates to
individual not UN responsibility, concerning the greater use of criminal
jurisdiction, with waivers of immunity if necessary, to enable the prosecution
of peacekeepers.2 5
The possibilities of using international and national structures to bring the
UN and other international organizations to account for their actions are limited
when compared to such possibilities existing with respect to states.26 In the
absence of effective legal remedies against international organizations directly,
attempts continue to be made to sue the member states, from the Tin Council
litigation of the 1980s2 7 to the cases brought to the International Court of Justice
25.
See, e.g., Report of the S-G's Special Advisor, supra, note 14, M 78-90; S-G Report on
accountability, supra note 20, 1 49.
26.

On the issue of remedies against international organizations see, e.g., KAREL WELLENS,

REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2002); James Crawford, The Charter of the United
Nations as a Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3, 12-15 (Hazel Fox

ed., 1997); Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26); Difference Relating to Immunity
from Process of a Special Rapporteur, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29) (hereinafter Special Rapporteur Case);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-L Decision on Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, in 14-22 (Oct. 2, 1995); ILA 10 Accountability Report, supra note 18, § 4. On the supervision
of the Security Council by the International Court of Justice see Questions of Interpretation and Application
of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K., Libya v.
U.S.A.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K., Libya v. U.S.A.),
Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 9 (Feb. 27); and the following commentary: T. Franck, The "Powers of
Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardianof UN Legality, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1992); V. GowliandDebbas, The Relationshipbetween the InternationalCourt of Justice and the Security Council in the Light
of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 643 (1994); B. Graefrath, Leave to the Courtwhat belongs to the
Court: The Libyan Case, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1993); C. Tomuschat, The Lockerbie Case before the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 48 REvIEw OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 38 (1992); D.

Akande, The InternationalCourtof Justice andthe Security Council: Is There Room for JudicialControl
ofDecisionsofthe PoliticalOrgansofthe UnitedNations?, 46 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 309 (1997). On remedies
in the context of international territorial administration, see, e.g., R. Wilde, Accountabilityand International
Actors in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L&COMP. L455 (2001); R. Wilde, The complex role
of the legal adviser when international organizations administer territory, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 95TH ANNUAL MEETING 251 (2001); Case U9/00 (Constitutional
Court ofBosnia;20951;20951 and Herzegovina) (Nov. 3,2000) (evaluating the Law;20963;20963 on State
Border Service;20967;20967), available at www.hrc.ba (last visited Mar. 22,2006). On the law applicable
to international organizations, see the sources cited infra note 59 and accompanying text.
27.
Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade and Industry and related appeals, Re
International Tin Council; Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council; Maclaine Watson & Co
Ltd v. International Tin Council (No 2) [198813 All ER 257 (Court of Appeal) (hereinafterTin Council cases
(CA)); [1990] 2 AC 418, [1989] 3 All ER 523, 81 I.L.R. 670 (1989) (House of Lords) (hereinafter 'Tin
Council cases (HL)). For commentary, see, e.g., C. Warbrick and 1.Cheyne, The InternationalTin Council,
36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 931 (1987); 1. Cheyne, The InternationalTin Council, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 417
(1989); 1.Cheyne, InternationalTin Council (3), 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 945 (1990).
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and the European Court of Human Rights concerning the 1999 NATO bombing
campaign. 28 However, the view of most international lawyers, affirmed in the
Tin Council cases and endorsed by the Institut de droit international,is that
member states of an international organization do not incur legal liability for the
acts of the organization act by virtue of their membership of it. 29 However,
some accept that member state responsibility might be in order if effective
remedies against international organizations are lacking.3"
This piece revisits the long-standing member-state-responsibility issue to
consider how advocates of the current legal position on it, and those who
countenance the possibility of recourse to member state responsibility,
understand the relationship between the two key policy issues at stake: the
effective functioning of international organizations, on the one hand, and the
promotion of accountability, on the other. I will suggest that both approaches
fail to accord due weight to the need for greater support generally by states for
enhanced scrutiny of international public policy.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXCLUSIVE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITY

The traditional approach to the law of international organizations conceals
the tension between international organization and individual state
responsibility, by conceiving responsibility for the acts of the organization (if
a distinct legal person, as with the United Nations) exclusively in terms of the
organization itself, not also the individual member states.
In international law, many important international organizations including
the UN enjoy distinct legal personality, separate from the legal personalities of
their member states. 3' In other words, legally, they are more than the sum of
their (state) parts. A corollary to this idea is that the distinct legal person is
responsible for the organization's acts.32 In consequence, when member states
28.
See the eight similar cases on Legality of Use of Force brought by Serbia and Montenegro
against the states involved in the military campaign, cited in supra note 4). See also Bankovi6 v. Belgium
and 16 Other Contracting States, Eur. Ct. H.R., Admissibility decision, Dec. 12,2001, reprintedin4lI.L.M.
517 (2002).
29.

See discussion and sources cited infra, Part 2.

30.

See discussion and sources cited infra, Part 4(c).

31.

See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,

1949 I.C.J. 174, at 179 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation for Injuries].

32.

See Reparation for Injuries, supra note 31; Special Rapporteur case, supra note 26, at

The United Nations International Law Commission (IL)

66.

is currently considering the topic of responsibility

of international organizations. For the Reports of the Special Rapporteur, Professor Giorgio Gaja, see First
Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, UN doc. AICN.4/532 (2003); Second Report on
Responsibility of International Organizations, UN doc. A/CN.4/541 (2004) Third Report on Responsibility

of International Organizations, UN doc. A/CN.4/553 (2005)). For consideration of the matter by the ILC, see
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perform certain acts as part of the structure of the international
organization-for example voting in the UN Security Council-as a matter of
law these acts are not state acts at all, but rather form part of the process of the
organization, for which the organization is responsible. Similarly, when states
act on behalf of the organization, and in the organization's name, as a matter of
law these are acts of the organization.
This situation might be denigrated as a "legal fiction" when compared with
the idea of state responsibility, but of course the concept of the state, and the
idea that state representatives engage the legal responsibility when they perform
acts in an official capacity, also involves imputing legal personality to an
abstract entity rather than a real person." Most international lawyers accept the
concept of legal personality and the correlative notion of distinct legal
responsibility on the part of international organizations; disagreement exists,
however, on the question of whether in addition to international organization
responsibility, member states are also liable for the acts of the organization-in
a secondary or concurrent manner-by virtue of their membership.
A minority of academic commentators have suggested that there is a
general rule of international law providing for such member state responsibility.
Such suggestions have been made in two main ways. In the first place,
commentators highlight the absence in international law of specific norms
providing for limited liability on the part of international organizations, a
position at odds with the treatment of corporations by many municipal legal
systems. It is argued that in the absence of such norms, member states are
secondarily responsible. 34 This argument is challengeable on the grounds that
the absence of positive rules providing for limited liability is matched by the
absence of such rules providing for secondary liability. Even if, then, there is
a lacuna in the law, it is not by itself capable of leading to a conclusion of
either secondary or limited liability. 35 Moreover, whether in this respect the
position of corporations in municipal law is analogous to the position of

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-seventh session (May 3 to June 3 and
July 11 to Aug. 5, 2005), UN doc. A/60/10 (May 2, 2005), Chapter V.
33.

Certain 'official' acts can also give rise to individual criminal responsibility in international law.

See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2003).
34.

See HENRY G. SCHERMERS, NTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw 780 (2nd ed. 1980) and the

discussion in Rosalyn Higgins, Report on the Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfillment
by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties 66 (1995) ANNUAIRE DE L'INsTrrUT
DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, vol. I, 252 (hereinafter Higgins 1995], at 266-7; see also IGNAZ SEIDLHOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS INAND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 119-20 (1987) [hereinafter SeidlHohenveldern].
35.

See Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 270, 286.
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international organizations 3in
international law is not to be assumed, as this
6
suggest.
to
seems
argument
In the second place, it has been suggested that the presence of limited
liability clauses in the constitutions of some international organizations37
implies that for those constitutions without such clauses, as in the case of the
UN Charter, member states would be liable for the acts of the relevant
organizations. Thus the clauses modify a general rule of international law
providing for member state liability. However, such clauses could merely
reflect uncertainty about the state of international law, and/or be motivated by
a desire to warn third parties about where liability would lie.38 In the absence
of a detailed examination of the travauxpreparatoiresof all the organizations
with such clauses, and a consideration of the overlap of membership of such
organizations with other organizations constituted without exclusion clauses,
the significance of such clauses in terms of identifying a general rule of
secondary liability is unclear.39
These two arguments have traditionally formed the exclusive basis for
considering the possibility of secondary or concurrent state liability,' ° and their
weakness has led most commentators and judicial authorities to hold with a
general proposition of non-liability. 4' This majority view, endorsed by the
Institut de droit internationalfollowing the report of then Professor Rosalyn
Higgins, is that there is no general principle of international law whereby the
member states of the organization involved incur legal liability in consequence
of the acts of international organizations by virtue of their membership of such
organizations."2 Such liability can only subsist if the constituent instruments of

36.

See id. at 267, 287.

37.
For such exclusions, see the discussion in Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 271-72 and Sir
Ralph Gibson in the Tin Council cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, at 354.
38.
Tin Council Cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, 354-55; Higgins 1995, supra
note 34, at 267, 271-73.
39.

Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 273.

40.
An argument has also been made that certain international organizations enjoy legal personality
that is only 'subjective,' viz. opposable only to member states, and not 'objective,' viz. opposable to nonmember states; because of this, member states are responsible for the acts of the organization as far as nonmember states are concerned. See the discussion in id. at 274-76.
41.

See Tin Council cases (HL), supra note 27, 81 LL.R. 670 (1989), at 679--81 (Lord Templeman);

710-15 (Lord Oliver).

42.
See Tin Council Cases (CA) and Tin Council Cases (HL), supranote 27. See generally Higgins
1995, supra note 34; INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION, THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR
MEMBER STATES OF THE NON-FULFILMENT BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS

TOWARD THIRD PARTIES (1995) available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig-chon 1993.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Institut Resolution].
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the international organizations explicitly provide for it, something which, as
mentioned, the UN Charter does not do in the case of the UN.43
Is this a politically supportable position?
1II. THE COMPETING POLITICAL ISSUES AT STAKE AND THE BALANCE
STRUCK BETWEEN THEM IN THE RATIONALE FOR THE LEGAL POSITION

When the Institut de droit internationaldrew its conclusion as to the
absence of a general rule of member state responsibility, it did so having taken
into account the two main competing political issues as stake, which it
described thus: "the tensions existing between the importance of the
independent responsibility of international organizations on the one hand, and
the need to protect third parties dealing with such international organizations,
on the other hand".'
These competing principles might be understood in terms of the effective
operation of international organizations, on the one hand, and accountability,
on the other. How have these principles and the effect on them of member state
responsibility been understood in international legal discourse? How was an
outcome excluding such responsibility reached on the basis that it
accommodated both principles?
A. Policy Issue 1: The Operation of InternationalOrganizations

The first key political issue at stake concerns, in the words of then
Professor Higgins, "the efficient and independent functioning of international
organizations."4 5
The Institut describes the principle thus: "support for the credibility and
independent functioning of international organizations and for the establishment of new international organizations."46
Member state responsibility as traditionally understood is seen as
undermining this principle. Professor Higgins points out that:
...if members know that they are potentially liable for contractual
damages or tortious harm caused by the acts of an international
organization, they will necessarily intervene in virtually all decisionmaking by international organizations. It is hard to see how the degree
43.
See Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 5; Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 273-74; see
also ROSALYN HIGGINs, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT47 (Clarendon
Press 1994).
44.

Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at pmbl. (emphasis in original).

45.

Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.

46.

Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 8.
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of monitoring and intervention required would be compatible with the
continuing status of the organization as truly independent, not only
from the host state, but from its membership.47
Here, then, we see a potential problem caused by conceiving member state
responsibility for the acts of international organizations: paralysis within
existing organizations, with consensus required for every decision, and states
reluctant to create and support new international organizations in the future out
of a fear of running the risk of liability for future acts they may not be able to
control. Such responsibility necessarily contradicts the nature of those
international organizations conceived in a manner whereby all member states
are not necessarily able to control all the acts of the organization, for example
when decisions are taken by the Security Council.
B. Policy Issue 2: Accountability
The functional effectiveness principle is only one half of the picture,
however. On the other hand, we have what might be regarded as the accountability principle. In the first place, as Professor Higgins states, third parties
should be protected: "from undue exposure to loss and damage, not of their
own cause, in relationships with [international] ...organizations."4 8

Here the focus is on those affected by the actions of international organizations, who should be provided with legal redress when such actions lead them
to suffer harm or some other loss. This victim-orientated approach leads to the
related violator-orientated approach of avoiding impunity, promoting the notion
that, in the words of Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern: "a state cannot escape its
responsibility under international law by entrusting to another legal person
[e.g., an international organization] the fulfillment of its international obligations."49
Professor Brownlie argues that "a State cannot by delegation [e.g., to an
international organization] ...

avoid responsibility for breaches of its duties

under international law.... This approach of public international law is not ad
hoc but stems directly from the normal concepts of accountability and
effectiveness." 5
47.

Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.

48.

Id.

49.

Seidl-Hohenveldem, supra note 34, at 121, quoted in Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 269.

50. I. Brownlie, State Responsibility: the Problem of Delegation, in VOLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN
NORMATIVEN ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITAT. FEsTCHRIFT FUR KARL ZEMANEK, zuM 65
GEBURTSTAG 300-01 (Konrad Ginther et al. eds., 1994), quoted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, REPORT OF THE SEVENTIETH

CONFERENCE HELD IN NEW DELHI,

2-6 APRIL 2002

(2002), available at http://www.ila-
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Similarly, in two cases before the European Court of Human Rights, the
Court stated that:
where States establish international organizations

. . .

there may be

implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be
incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention,
however, if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their
responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity
covered by such attribution.5
In one of the English cases concerning the collapse of the International Tin
Council (ITC), an international organization, and the possibility of obtaining
remedies from member states of the organization, Lord Justice Nourse stated
that "international law would surely presume that states which were willing to
join together in such an enterprise [creating an international organization]
would intend that they should bear the burdens together no less than the
benefits. 52
These twin principles-that third parties affected by the acts of
international organizations should be given redress, and that states should not
be able to evade legal responsibility by transferring competences to international organizations-would clearly be supported if member states were
made legally responsible for the acts of organizations of which they are a
member.
C. MaintainingLack of Member State Responsibility and Enhancing the
Accountability of InternationalOrganizations
How are the two policy issues outlined above accommodated by the
traditional position excluding member state responsibility? Certainly such a
position promotes the first policy objective of ensuring the effective functioning
of international organizations or, rather, fails to undermine this objective,
accepting, of course, the assumption that member state responsibility would

hq.org/html/main listofcomm.accountability.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter ILA Report] text
accompanying note 65.
51.

Beer & Reagan v. Germany, App. No. 28934/95, Judgment of Feb. 18, 1999,

57 (1999),

availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2006). Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App.
No. 26083/94, Judgment of Feb. 18, 1999,

67 (1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng. This

principle was invoked (by way of application, mutatis mutandis, to the creation of treaty obligations, in T.I.
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43844/98 (2000), Admissibility Decision, Mar. 7, 2000, available at

http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
52.

Tin Council cases (CA), supra note 27, [1988] 3 All ER 257, at 333 (Nourse LJ).
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indeed have such an undermining effect were it to be introduced. Thus the
Institut de droit internationalresolved that
[I]mportant considerations of policy, including support for the
credibility and independent functioning of international organizations
and for the establishment of new international organizations, militate
against the development of a general and comprehensive rule of
liability of member States to third parties for the obligations of
international organizations.5 3
However, those supporting this position do not do so by disregarding the
accountability principle; they do not conclude that the effective functioning of
international organizations trumps the need to ensure accountability. Rather,
they seek to promote accountability through alternative means: greater
safeguards for third parties operating in relation to international organizations
directly. Professor Higgins argues that "a variety of protective measures should
properly be taken-whether insurance, or the demand of specific ad hoc
guarantees from members, or other measures. . . and the Institut concludes
that:
Important considerations of policy entitle third parties to know, so
that they may freely choose their course of action, whether, in relation
to any particular transaction or to dealings generally with an
international organization, the financial liabilities that may ensue are
those of the organization alone or also of the members jointly or
subsidiarily. Accordingly, an international organization should
specify the position regarding liability
1) in its Rules and contracts;
2) in communications made to the third party prior to the
event or transaction leading to liability; or
3) in response to any specific request by any third party for
information on the matter."5
This approach was formulated in the backdrop of the series of cases before
the English courts arising out of the collapse of the ITC mentioned above.
These cases concerned contracts freely entered into by private contractors with
the ITC. Such a "safeguarding" approach is inappropriate, however, in circumstances where third parties have not chosen the transaction in question-for
example when individuals are subject to the control of international
53.

Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 8.

54.

Higgins 1995, supra note 34, at 288.

55.

Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 9.
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organizations in field operations authorized by Security Council resolutions
passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or, more broadly, where the UN
fails to act to prevent human rights atrocities, as in Srebrenica and Rwanda.56
In the case of the conduct of territorial administration by the UN, individuals
are placed under the control of international organizations regardless of whether
they have accepted such control in the light of the remedies available to them."7
Whereas in transactions that are freely entered into, adequate remedies for
third parties would not necessarily be required-the key requirement being
transparency as to the nature of remedies, so that an informed decision can be
made-for transactions that are imposed, adequate remedies are arguably
necessary. In the case of a failure to protect, being "on notice" of a lack of
responsibility is beside the point; the idea here is that there should be a
responsibility to take effective action.58
The underlying rationale for the lack of member state responsibility in
relation to the acts of international organizations has to be understood, then, in
terms of a separate area of international law concerning the responsibility of
international organizations and the provision of remedies against these actors
directly. When the two are taken together, both policy objectives are seemingly
supported: the functioning of international organizations is not compromised,
nor is securing accountability and redress.
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SETrLEMENT

A. Lack of Remedies Against InternationalOrganizations
The adequacy of the current legal arrangement in securing both effective
international organizations and proper levels of accountability presupposes an
adequate regime of responsibility, applicable law and remedies against
international organizations. However, as far as the law is concerned, whether
and to what extent international organizations are subject to national and
international law is relatively unclear;59 moreover, no standing international

56.

On 'responsibility to protect,' see High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17. See also REPORT

OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO

PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/conuiission-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter ICISS Report].
57.

On international territorial administration, see, e.g., Wilde 2001, supra note 6.

58.
On this point see High-Level Panel Report, supra note 17, l 199-203; see also ICISS Report,
supra note 56, in particular at 69 ff.
59.

On the question of applicable law to international organizations, see generallyMOSHE HIRSCH,

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLEs

(1995); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NEILS BLOKKER INTERNATIONAL INSTITLTIONAL LAW (3rd ed., 1990), §§
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court or tribunal enjoys jurisdiction to hear complaints brought directly against
international organizations, and such complaints are usually barred on the
domestic level due to the enjoyment of privileges and immunities.' Even if,
then, it is beyond question that international organizations are capable of being
legally responsible for their acts by virtue of their possession of international
legal personality,6' what law applies to them, and what judicial body exists to
apply this law directly in cases where it is alleged that the law has been
breached, remains uncertain.
For example, individuals complaining of a breach of their civil and
political rights by a member state of the Council of Europe would be able to
invoke the state's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR) (provided the alleged breach took place within the state's 'jurisdiction'
for the purposes of the Convention), and if they were denied an effective legal
remedy against that state in domestic courts, would be entitled to bring a case
to the European Court of Human Rights.62 Such individuals complaining of a

1572-1582; Crawford 1997, supra note 26; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1998 (not yet in force),
available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/trbtstat.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); Interpretation of the
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, at 90 (Dec.
20); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided
by SFOR and Others, 46 (Oct. 18, 2000); ILA 10 Accountability Report, supranote 18, pt. II, §§ 1-4 and
sources cited therein. On applicable law to peace/field operations in particular, see. e.g., Legal Opinions of
the Secretariat of the United Nations, Question of the possible accession of intergovernmental organizations
to the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, 1972 U.N. JuRtD.Y.B. 153; United Nations
Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of internationalhumanitarianlaw, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999); D. W. BOwETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 484-516
(1964); D. Shraga, UN Peacekeeping Operations:Applicability of InternationalHumanitarianLaw and
Responsibilityfor Operations-RelatedDamage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406 (2000); U. Palwankar, Applicability
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw to UnitedNations Peace-KeepingForces, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
THE RED CROSS (1993) 227; Y. Sandoz, The Application of HumanitarianLaw by the Armed Forcesof the
UnitedNations Organization,INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (1978) 274; D. Schindler, United
Nations Forces and International HumanitarianLaw, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANrrARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRtNCIPLES INHONOR OF JEAN PICTET 521 (Christophe Swinarski ed.,
1984); R. Wilde, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR Governance of 'Development'
Refugee CampsShould Be Subject to InternationalHuman Rights Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 107
(1998).
60.

See sources cited supra note 26.

61.

See sources cited supra note 32.

62.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome,
art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222: "The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right". For the criteria for
admissibility of individual applications, see generally id. art. 25.
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breach of their civil and political rights by the UN-for example in Kosovo,
where the UN is the governmental authority-such a breach is not regulated by
the European Convention, domestic remedies are largely absent because of the
enjoyment of legal immunities by the UN and its officials, and there is no
standing before the European Court of Human Rights to bring cases directly
against the UN as opposed to an ECHR contracting state. An Ombudsman can
hear complaints against the UN but its decisions are purely recommendatory
and it has no powers of enforcement.63
It follows that, in general, the legal bar against remedies against the
member states of international organizations flowing from the lack of liability
on the part of member states is matched by the lack of remedies available
against such organizations as a matter of fact. Although, then, states act
through international organizations in a broad range of affairs, the remedies
obtainable against them or the organizations involved for breaches of
international law are severely limited.
It is no doubt in consequence of this general problem that Lord Justice
Griffiths remarked in one of the Tin Councilcases that the appellants, who were
barred from suing the individual member states of the Council and had no
remedy against the organization itself, "have suffered a grave injustice. '
Those endorsing the general view of a lack of member state responsibility
in this broader context have focused their attention on seeking to improve
mechanisms for securing the accountability of international organizations. The
aforementioned International Law Association study, for example, concluded
in 2004 that this regime should be enhanced.65
Underlying this approach is perhaps a certain faith that such enhancements
are a likely possibility in the medium term; even if, then, the accountability
principle will not be secured by retaining a lack of member state responsibility,
this is a price worth paying because it ensures the continued functioning of
international organizations and will be relatively short-lived.
Is this faith in the prospects for greater overall, externally-enforced UN
accountability well-placed, however? One approach to this question is to
consider what motivates states to support international organizations, and the
potential effect this motivational structure can have on the position taken by
them as to the question of international organization accountability.
The Ombudsperson was established by the Special Representative of the Secretary General in
63.
Kosovo in June 2000. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION INKosovo, UNMIK REGULATION 2000/38, June
30, 2000, as amended by UNMIK REGULATION 2003/8, Apr. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/regualtion2000_38.htm (last visited Mar. 9,2006). See sources cited
supra note 26 (discussing accountability issues in the context of international territorial administration).
64.

Tin Council cases (HL), supranote 27, 81 LLR. 670 (1989), 683-4.

65.

See LA Report, supra note 50.
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B. The Prospectsfor GreaterInternationalOrganizationAccountability
Clearly one motivation for state support of international organizations is
the ability to transfer the pursuit of certain policies to the international level.
Moreover, one reason why this can be attractive is that states are no longer
individually responsible for the promotion of the policy-it is the international
organization, not them, that is responsible. So, for example, before the 2003
war against Iraq the idea was put forward by the US and its allies that the UN
had failed to disarm Iraq through peaceable means, and that this failure by the
global organization-rather than its individual member states-therefore
justified unilateral military action by certain states who were, by definition, not
responsible for the failure. This idea by itself would not militate against the idea
of greater remedies against international organizations.
However, it might even be said that this process of displacement from
states to international organizations is also appealing to states because of the
comparative lack of accountability that exists vis t vis international organizations when compared to states. In the context of an international organization
accountability deficit, displacement means that the state is not made responsible
for the policy and the entity that is responsible is not subject to an effective
accountability mechanism. Thus the policy can be promoted without much
scrutiny. This is of course an effective means of realizing a particular
policy-transfer it onto another actor in relation to whom no effective
mechanism for review exists. Because of this, states may well have an interest
in keeping international organizations unaccountable.
It is therefore necessary to consider the important role international
organizations can play in enabling states to promote policies in an
unaccountable fashion. The relatively unaccountable nature of international
organizations may be a key structural feature as far as their importance to states
is concerned, not something that has come about by accident or, alternatively,
solely because of the way states and international organizations are sometimes
understood as normative opposites, with international organizations seen, unlike
states, as somehow intrinsically humanitarian, selfless and even-handed, and
not therefore requiring the kinds of accountability mechanisms that would be
in order in the case of states.
The traditional settlement, seeking to enhance the accountability of
international organizations rather than opting for member state responsibility,
so that both the functioning of such organizations and the existence of effective
accountability structures operate, is exposed as problematic because it ignores
the possibility that states may wish to block greater international organization
accountability as a companion to the lack of member state responsibility. If
such greater accountability were to come about, then, states might actually seek
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withdraw their support for international organizations. Conceiving member
state responsibility is not the only policy prescription jeopardizing the first
policy objective of ensuring state support for international organizations, then;
promoting greater international organization responsibility might also have this
effect.
Attempts to resolve the problem of impunity by focusing exclusive
attention on greater international organization responsibility may therefore be
misguided, in that their prescriptions may be blocked by states objecting to the
underlying policies they promote through international organizations being
made subject to greater scrutiny. It may, then, actually be much more difficult
to reconcile the effective functioning of international organizations with a
greater enhancement of accountability.
C. Revisiting the Settlement and Introducing a Contingent Factor
An alternative approach, accommodating the risk of a failure to enhance
structures of accountability in relation to international organizations, is to make
the continuance of the traditional settlement denying member state responsibility contingent on improvements in such structures. If improvement is not
forthcoming, then the introduction of member state responsibility can be
considered. Such an approach can be seen in a series of cases brought to the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights concerning the question of
state responsibility relating to the acts of international organizations under the
European Convention of Human Rights, two of which were mentioned earlier.
In one such case, M, the European Commission of Human Rights stated that if
the transfer of state powers to an international organization necessarily
excluded the state's
[R]esponsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of
the transferred powers.., the guarantees of the Convention could
wantonly be limited or excluded and thus be deprived of their
peremptory character. The object and purpose of the Convention as
an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires
that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its
safeguards practical and effective .... Therefore the transfer of
powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the
Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights
will receive an equivalent protection.'

66.
M. and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 13258/87,64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 138, 145 (1990).
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What is perhaps implicit in this dictum-that if there is no equivalent
protection of human rights within the organization, then the transfer of
competences to the organization would engage state responsibility-is made
explicit in the later Matthews case, where the European Court of Human Rights
stated that "[t]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to
international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be
'secured.' Member States' responsibility therefore continues even after such
a transfer.,

67

The possibility of falling back on member state responsibility is also left
open by the Institut, which asserted a "failure to take any of' the aforementioned actions it prescribed to safeguard the rights of third parties "should be
taken as a relevant factor in considering the liability of the States members. 68
This suggests, then, that in the traditional settlement the scenario of non
member-state responsibility coupled with greater third party safeguards-and,
one would add, a strict regime of accountability for those activities of international organizations where the issue of consent by third parties is
inapplicable-is posited as an ideal, in that it safeguards both the principle of
the smooth operation of international organizations and the principle of
accountability. If, however, this ideal is not possible because an effective
accountability regime for, and third party safeguards in relation to, international
organizations is lacking, then an imperfect alternative should be adopted,
whereby the latter principle is promoted through means detrimental to the
realization of the former principle.
D. The Limits of the Contingency Model
According to the assumption that member state responsibility undermines
the effective functioning of international organizations, clearly the contingency
model assumes that this price will have to be paid to secure accountability if the
ideal model of international organization accountability is not forthcoming. It
might be said, however, that the negative aspects of this imperfect solution are
not too great, because in the medium to long term greater accountability
mechanisms operating in relation to international organizations will be
forthcoming, something that perhaps might be hastened by the introduction of
a regime of responsibility operating against member states. Thus the
detrimental effect on the working of international organizations will be short
lived. This echoes the earlier assumption made in relation to the conventional
view rejecting member state responsibility.

67.

Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 1 32 (1999).

68.

Institut Resolution, supra note 42, at art. 9.
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Given what has been said already about the potential benefits for states of
a lack of international organization responsibility, however, is it really possible
to be confident in assuming the short-lived nature of the contingency model?
The strategy of pushing for member state responsibility might not actually
motivate states to support greater international organization accountability so
as to stave off attempts to make states directly liable, because more fundamentally states may not wish any effective accountability mechanisms to
operate.
To be sure, as an alternative to direct state responsibility greater international organization accountability would mean that states could preserve the
displacement of responsibility onto international organizations, but the much
greater accountability that would then operate would mean that the policies that
have been displaced would be subjected to greater scrutiny, something which
states may not wish to have happen. Instead of leading to a greater push for
international organization accountability, then, the member state accountability
model might actually precipitate a challenge by states to the existing
mechanisms that enforce their own responsibility directly, for example international human rights bodies.
The contingency model, then, may not be a short-term remedy, and as such
may come at a higher price in terms of undermining the effective functioning
of international organizations than has usually been understood. The nature of
dilemma faced by those seeking to promote such effective functioning and
accountability is perhaps, therefore, different: not whether the push for
immediately enhancing accountability justifies a short period during which the
work of international organizations may suffer, but rather how a more long-term
perceived conflict between accountability, on the one hand, and the effective
functioning of international organizations, on the other, is to be understood.
V. CONCLUSION

Attempts to rectify the inconsequential nature of international organization
liability as far as substantive legal outcomes are concerned-pushing for greater
international organization accountability, and possibly falling back on member
state responsibility as a stop-gap before such improvements are made-will
both make the concept of multilateral liability more costly for states. The
international organization accountability model, although retaining the displacement of policy from states to international organizations, would still mean that
substantive policy outcomes--or lack of outcomes in the case of a failure to
prevent atrocities-are subject to much greater scrutiny than at present. The
future prospects of such a model depend in large part on the willingness of
states to accept such policies being subject to this enhanced form of scrutiny,
something which cannot be assumed.
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Equally, the prospects of the member state responsibility stop-gap model
depend on states' willingness to accept this greater policy scrutiny and its
operation through mechanisms operating in relation to them directly. It also
risks undermining the effective functioning of international organizations
insofar as member state responsibility is understood to have such an effect.
Moreover, it may not lead to greater state support for enhanced international
organization accountability as an alternative to direct state responsibility if
states are reluctant to see any enhanced policy scrutiny. In such circumstances,
states might opt for a diminution in the mechanisms that operate against them
directly.
Any transformation of the current accountability deficit in relation to the
acts of international organizations depends not only on international organizations themselves accepting greater scrutiny; it is also necessary to acknowledge
what is at stake for member states in such a process, and way in which the
current settlement enables states to pursue policies with the broader context of
a relatively attenuated environment of scrutiny. In seeking to understand the
prospects for such a transformation, therefore, one has to take account of the
willingness on the part of member states to have the international policy they
promote through international organizations subject to a greater regime of
accountability than is the case at present.

